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What Else Is Civilization For? 
Narration Overcoming Fear and Trauma 
in Graham Swift
Graham Swift’s fairly slim body of work (eight novels and a collection of 
short stories) displays striking thematic consistence. Motifs of loss and crisis 
appear in each of his oeuvres, and most of them are narratives of people 
attempting to come to terms with traumatising experience. Fragmented and 
repetitive, the structure of Swift’s texts represents the characters’ sense of 
alienation from the world and entrapment in traumatic temporality which 
refuses linear development. At the same time, for many of Swift’s scarred 
protagonists, great and personal narratives are a method of dealing with the 
trauma of experience and the overwhelming meaninglessness of unmediated 
reality. Faced with its ever elusive nature, most of Swiftian narrators learn that 
their efforts at overcoming fear can only be temporary and tentative. While 
mourning the impossibility of regaining original wholeness, Swift’s novels 
celebrate the contingency of the human condition and question the value of 
absolutist narratives aiming at eradicating the uncertainty of their subjects.
The inaccessibility of the factor motivating obsessive repetition in indi-
viduals affected by trauma as well as their sense of separation from their own 
experience or presence in the world implies an analogy with the traumatic 
experience of entry into the symbolic realm, also organised by a gap between 
the individual and the object of his or her desire. Stephen Ross notes that 
trauma provokes repetition which “effectively symbolises the traumatic kernel 
that organises his or her symptoms without ever approaching the truth of the 
motivating traumatic episode” and notes the analogy of this symbolisation 
with the way in which the symbolic order employs “alternative signifiers as 
provisional substitutive compensations for the irremediable lack created in 
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its radical reorganisation of the world.”1 For most of Swift’s narrators, the 
order imposed on reality by the use of the symbolic structures of language 
is indeed provisional. The aim of this article is to compare the way in which 
Swift approaches the contingency of the consolation offered by storytelling 
in his two early novels, Shuttlecock (1982) and Waterland (1983). The choice 
is motivated by the uniqueness of the position of Prentis, the narrator of the 
former novel, who, unlike other tormented voices of Swift’s fiction, is appar-
ently quite successful in overcoming his sense of frustration and detachment 
from his idealised image of the natural world and who furthermore claims 
to have abandoned without regret his initial desire for complete knowledge. 
Several critics convincingly question the credibility of the narrator and his 
achievement, contrasting him with the more mature figure of Tom Crick in 
the latter work. While Prentis assumes absolute control of the final section 
of his account, suggesting the reader should take its reliability for granted, 
Crick remains persistently hesitant, reluctantly but inevitably abandoning the 
comforting illusions of all-encompassing narratives.
Tamas Benyei in his article “The Novels of Graham Swift: Family Photos,” 
specifies as one of the central themes in Swift’s prose “the essential rupture 
between ordinary individual experience and what is referred to as history 
[which] is a privileged example of […] the more general rupture between the 
individual psyche and experience in general.”2 The wounding character of 
this rupture invites a link with the notion of trauma as elaborated by Cathy 
Carruth on the basis of Freud’s “The Pleasure Principle,” which she describes 
as follows: “the wound of the mind […] is not, like the wound of the body, 
a simple and healable event, but rather an event that […] is experienced too 
soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully known and is therefore not available to 
consciousness until it imposes itself again, repeatedly, in the nightmares and 
repetitive actions of the survivor.”3
In discussing the traumatic temporality experienced by the characters of 
Swift’s first novel, The Sweet-Shop Owner (1980), Benyei notes how the “es-
sentially wounded, dislocated nature of the time of the family” is represented 
in the narrative structure by interruptions of the protagonist’s internal mono-
1 Stephen Ross, “A Very Brief Introduction to Lacan,” last modified February 6, 2002, 
http://web.uvic.ca/~saross/lacan.html.
2 Tamas Benyei, “The Novels of Graham Swift. Family Photos,” in Contemporary 
British Fiction, ed. Richard J. Lane, Rod Mengham and Philip Tew (Oxford: Polity, 2003), 
p. 42.
3 Cathy Carruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1996). Quoted in Richard Russell, “Embodiments of History and De-
layed Confessions: Graham Swift’s Waterland as Trauma Fiction,” Papers on Language 
& Literature 45 (2009), accessed August 28, 2010, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d
=5031566878.
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logue.4 Similar stylistic devices, including disturbances of chronology, reap-
pear throughout most other novels of the author. Richard Russell offers the 
example of the digressive narrative style of Waterland as illustrating the dif-
ficulty of coming to terms with trauma through its interweaving of personal 
experience with historical events both local and global, shifting between times 
and perspectives, or employing a variety of genres to indicate the difficulty of 
the task of imposing order on its material. Indeed, Russell classifies Waterland 
as “a trauma fiction” and quotes the dilemma posed by the author of the 
term, Anne Whitehead: “if trauma comprises an event or experience which 
overwhelms the individual and resists language or representation, how then 
can it be narrativised in fiction?” The suggested solution is “that the impact 
of trauma can only adequately be represented by mimicking its forms and 
symptoms, so that temporality and chronology collapse, and narratives are 
characterized by repetition and indirection.”5 However, the collapse of the 
narrative and chronology is perhaps most explicitly represented in “allegori-
cal figure[s] of silence,” which Benyei points out as one extreme of linguistic 
responses to trauma in Swift, whose “every novel contains […] a catatonic 
character […] living in a home and embodying some mystifying secret that 
another character is obsessively trying to excavate […] also embodying the 
element beyond language that all the novels contain within themselves like 
a secret centre.”6 Among examples are characters of Prentis Senior in Shut-
tlecock, who is literally in a state of a “language coma,” refusing any form of 
explanation that his son fervently desires or the wife of Waterland’s narrator, 
Mary Crick, whose madness is displayed precisely in her inability to tell the 
trauma of her life. An experience of a crude abortion in her adolescence, re-
pressed for a long time, finally disturbs the normal mental process of memory 
in a manner symptomatic for other trauma victims in Swift’s prose: “First 
there is nothing; then there is happening; a state of emergency. And after the 
happening, only the telling of it. But sometimes the happening won’t stop 
and let itself be turned into memory. So she’s still in the midst of events… 
which have not ceased. Which is why it’s impossible to get through. Which 
is why she cannot cross into the safe, sane realm of hindsight and answer 
the questions of the white-coated doctors: ‘Now tell us, Mrs Crick, you can 
tell us everything, you can tell…’ ”7
One character who is liberated from traumatic memory is Mary’s father 
in law, Henry Crick, a shell-shocked soldier who comes back from WWI as 
“a hospital case [who] limps and blinks and falls flat on his face at sudden 
4 Benyei, “Family Photos,” pp. 45–46.
5 Quoted in Russell, “Embodiments of History,” http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a-
=o&d=5031566878.
6 Benyei, “Family Photos,” pp. 52–53.
7 Graham Swift, Waterland (London: Picador, 1984), p. 284.
Sławomir Konkol108
noises.” He also finds himself helpless in the face of the atrocities he witnessed 
and unable to process them, turn them into a narrative: “For a long time he 
finds it hard to separate in his mind the familiar-but-foreign fields of the Fens 
and the foreign-but-familiar mudscapes he has come from … He thinks: there 
is only reality, there are no stories left. About his war experience he says: 
‘I remember nothing.’ ”8 However, thanks to a “story-book romance”9 with 
his nurse, he “learns, also, to tell those stories of old Flanders… which will 
lead on to other stories, till the pain, save for sporadic twinges in the knee, is 
almost gone.”10 It is Helen’s story-telling which is used to reintroduce Henry 
into language and work through the traumatic event enabling him to overcome 
“the paradoxical temporality of the trauma,”11 in which the momentous past 
event continues to be repeated endlessly in the victim’s mind. An absence of 
meaning is at the centre of the repetition, since Henry is not actually haunted 
by the horrifying details of his experience; instead “it’s oblivion he’d like to 
forget, it’s that sense of the dizzy void he can’t get away from.”12 In this, his 
trauma is reminiscent of Bruce Fink’s presentation of “[t]he unframed real 
– the reality […] devoid of categories, not located in any symbolic context 
[which] resists … location or contextualization.” Treating trauma therefore 
means, in Fink’s terms, that language “has to be brought in ex post facto” in 
order to “speak those events, weave them into a fabric of meaning, and thus 
diffuse their impact.” In Waterland, this is the task of Helen, who recognises 
the need to provide her patients precisely with “the symbolic or linguistic 
parameters in which the experience fits.”13 Her strategy is arguably opposite 
to that of Prentis, when she tells the traumatised soldiers: “No, don’t forget. 
Don’t erase it. You can’t erase it. But make it into a story.”14 The therapeutic 
value of narrativisation allows a domestication of the inexpressible experience 
without denying its irreducibly traumatic character.
The other kind of response to trauma is represented by the narrators 
obsessing over the extralinguistic mystery, whose “loquacious, meandering, 
self-conscious, highly rhetorical and profoundly symptomatic filibustering”15 
constitutes an attempt to restore order in reality through language. Tom Crick, 
arguably the most representative of these figures, “knows about the effica-
cy of storytelling from his parents – his father, Henry, who descends from 
 8 Swift, Waterland, p. 17.
 9 Swift, Waterland, p. 130.
10 Swift, Waterland, pp. 194–195.
11 Benyei, “Family Photos,” p. 48.
12 Swift, Waterland, p. 193.
13 Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter. Reading Ecrits Closely (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2004), pp. 171–172.
14 Swift, Waterland, p. 194.
15 Benyei, “Family Photos,” p. 53.
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a long line of storytellers, and his mother, Helen, whose work with veterans 
of the Great War teaches her that stories are ‘a way of bearing what won’t 
go away, a way of making sense of madness.’ ”16 Tellingly, the narrator of 
Shuttlecock does not fit into either of these modes, since he “sings the virtues 
of suppressing traumatic knowledge, to dissolve – rather than to solve – the 
problems diagnosed by the earlier novel. The validity of this distinction is 
borne out by Swift’s later work, starting with Waterland, which reveals all 
attempts to exorcize the problem of trauma to be doomed to backfire and 
takes up the search for alternative, more fruitful ways of dealing with the 
issue.”17 Since Prentis ends his narrative more or less at the point when the 
suppression takes place, he is able to insist on its completeness. However, as 
some critics have pointed out, the ethics as well as the effectiveness of the 
move are questionable.
Prentis’s initial situation is that of frustration and alienation. Overwhelmed 
by two paternal figures – his own, idealised father, a WWII hero and a domi-
neering, manipulative boss, a supervisor of the dead crimes division of the 
London police – Prentis admits being a weak man who vents his frustration 
by terrorizing his wife and two young sons and who is not really able to 
communicate with them. The narrator’s sense that he lacks influence over 
his circumstances is evident in his relations with Prentis senior and Quinn, 
both of whom frustrate his desire for knowledge of his father’s past. The fa-
ther himself has fallen into a quasi-catatonic state, denying all possibility of 
communication, while Quinn deliberately hides information from Prentis and 
hinders his attempts at discovering the truth of cases he is working on. Pren-
tis’s increasing suspicion about his father’s heroic past is fuelled by Quinn’s 
implying the existence of evidence for Prentis senior’s treason. In absence of 
a direct source of information, Prentis is forced to resort to rereading obses-
sively his father’s autobiography and struggling to draw conclusions from 
incomplete materials submitted to him by Quinn.
The father’s autobiography, whose title, identical with that of Swift’s novel, 
invites comparisons with the son’s narrative, also sets a model for the protago-
nist’s desire to be reunited with nature. Stef Craps notes that Prentis senior, 
in the crucial moments of his narrative, “assumes positively ‘Wordsworthian’ 
overtones in [his] invocation of nature as a benign force responsive to man’s 
needs and desires” and claims that in his description the “escape from the 
Château becomes an attempt to re-establish the harmonious relationship with 
nature which the war is seen to have disrupted.”18 Significantly, the narrator 
16 Irene Kacandes, Talk Fiction (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
2001), p. 110.
17 Stef Craps, Trauma and Ethics in the Novels of Graham Swift: No Short-Cuts to 
Salvation (Brighton, Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), p. 61.
18 Craps, Trauma and Ethics, p. 62.
Sławomir Konkol110
explicitly admits the conventionality of his observations: “Since then I have 
come to believe – a blatant case of the pathetic fallacy, no doubt – that woods 
and the trees are always on the side of the fugitive and the victim, never on 
the side of the oppressor.”19 His son, however, appears to decide finally to 
take them at face value. In the shortest chapter of the novel,20 he asks his 
wife: “ ‘Marian’, I say (she is still talking to her plants), ‘do you believe in the 
pathetic fallacy? That it’s really a fallacy, I mean?”21 The subsequent account 
of an idyllic trip with his family to a beach and anthropomorphic descriptions 
of the landscape imply his own answer to the question. Stef Craps points out 
that Prentis “uses the Camber Sands episode to impose closure on his story,” 
and that his narrative apparently overlooks the vague status of the unstable 
area between land and sea, constantly threatened by the incoming tide as 
well as “relics of the war that still littered the region.”22 The pathetic fallacy 
is employed as a valid method of conclusively overcoming the uncomfortable 
contingency of human existence, even while the narrator himself hints at the 
limitations of the strategy.
As a result of a showdown with Quinn, Prentis arrives at a similar de-
cision concerning his approach to traumatic past. Even before he receives 
suggestions of any incriminating evidence, he begins to doubt his father’s 
self-portrayal: while the descriptions of his work as a spy are detailed and 
factual, it is not so with “the goings on in that interrogation room, and 
other, sinister rooms [about which] Dad is silent, or circumspect.”23 Con-
sidering possible explanations of this vagueness, Prentis decides that it is 
not the result of amnesia but rather a traumatic memory, “not in the least 
impaired, still vivid-sharp, but the memory of something so terrible that it 
cannot be repeated, cannot be spoken or written of.” While attempting “to 
discover […] some inkling of this experience beyond words,”24 Prentis further 
becomes increasingly suspicious of his impression that “[t]hese pages are more 
vivid, more real, more believable than any other part of the book.”25 In her 
discussion of conventions of realism as “talking over” and at the same time 
disclosing the trauma of the real, Lena Magnone observes that “[r]ealism can 
not really be said to mirror reality but rather the drama of our separation 
from it,”26 arguing that the exaggerated representation of the world in realist 
19 Graham Swift, Shuttlecock (London: Picador, 1997), p. 164.
20 Quoted here in its entirety.
21 Swift, Shuttlecock, p. 215.
22 Swift, Shuttlecock, p. 216.
23 Swift, Shuttlecock, p. 105.
24 Swift, Shuttlecock, p. 106.
25 Swift, Shuttlecock, pp. 106–107.
26 Lena Magnone, “Traumatyczny realizm,” in Rewolucja pod spodem, ed. Przemysław 
Czapliński (Poznań: Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne, 2008), p. 25. My translation.
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literature proves “more real than reality” and is suspicious precisely because 
of its excessive fidelity to detail.27 Prentis’s doubts about his father’s text are 
supported by a suggestion of Quinn, who speculates that the book may quite 
literally serve as a cover for an absence of heroic past: “He starts to see the 
publication of his memoirs […] as a means rebutting once and for all the 
possibility of exposure, of presenting the hero-image in such a complete and 
thorough way that no one will dare challenge it.” In an argument not dis-
similar from Magnone’s, Quinn implies that this is why the final chapters 
have to be more convincing than any other part of the book; after all “that’s 
where all the urgency is. It’s here that he’s trying to save himself. Why does 
it read like a real escape? Because it is an escape, a quite real escape, of 
a kind.”28 The ostentatious realism of this section may therefore be seen as 
grounded in its function, which is to hide from the reader the inexpressible 
traumatic core motivating the whole narrative. By accepting Quinn’s offer 
to burn the file possibly containing the details of his father’s betrayal and 
consequently replacing Quinn in the role of “a disseminator and destroyer of 
information, a dictator of fact,”29 Prentis performs his own escape, in turn 
inviting the reader’s distrust of his account. However, he also dismisses it 
immediately before his final reflection on pathetic fallacy: “Once you have 
read [this book], it may be better not to peer too hard beneath the surface 
of what it says – or […] what it doesn’t say.”30
Craps notes that with its final chapter Shuttlecock inscribes itself in the 
convention of Bildungsroman, which requires the hero to achieve a state of 
harmony and maturity, “described by [Franco] Moretti in terms which call 
to mind the device of the pathetic fallacy and the fusion with nature to 
which it aspires: ‘Ultimate symbolic gratification: the world speaks our lan-
guage.’ ”31 For Prentis, the invocation of Romantic vocabulary is a means to 
legitimise his claims of finally fulfilling social expectations and living up to 
the standards set by the idealised figure of his father. His approach, however, 
is questionable even in the light of its aforementioned “Wordsworthian over-
tones.” As Elizabeth Wright argues, following Friedrich Schiller’s distinction 
between naïve and sentimental poetry, where the former is characterised by 
“what he saw as unselfconscious, unmediated relation to nature in which 
the real and the ideal are, at least momentarily at one” while the latter by 
“a self-conscious distanced one in which the poet is aware of his (symbolic) 
alienation,” Wordsworth’s tendency for mourning his losses through poetry 
27 Magnone, “Traumatyczny realizm,” p. 26.
28 Swift, Shuttlecock, p. 187.
29 Patrick O’Donnell, “Masterplots II: Shuttlecock,” The Salem Press (January 1 1987). 
Quoted in Craps, Trauma and Ethics, p. 58.
30 Swift, Shuttlecock, p. 214.
31 Craps, Trauma and Ethics, p. 55.
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makes him a “sentimental” poet, prepared to acknowledge the limits of his 
power over his linguistic medium as well as those of the medium itself.32 
The speaking voice of Wordsworth’s poetry is thus arguably far more willing 
to embrace the tension between the attempts to symbolise experience and 
what resists symbolisation than Prentis, whose wish for “erasure or denial of 
a traumatic reality documented by the records of the dead crimes department”33 
clearly undermines the ethical validity of Shuttlecock’s denouement. Donald 
Kaczvinsky openly challenges the maturation of the protagonist: “He has not 
‘progressed’ into a more humane and sympathetic character […] but ‘created’ 
or ‘invented’ a self, through a textual strategy that at the same time broadens 
and secures his power base.”34 In Wright’s psychoanalytical terms, the narra-
tor of Shuttlecock encloses himself in a fantasy of imaginary plenitude, which 
serves “to hide from the subject both the subject’s own inadequacy within 
the symbolic and the symbolic’s inadequacy in mapping the subject and the 
world.”35 Much like an infant in Lacan’s mirror stage, experiencing a sense 
of mastery over its own unified image, Prentis ignores the precariousness of 
his self-image and concludes his narrative with an enforced vision of illusory 
completion.
While Shuttlecock only begins to question the validity of its protagonist’s 
narrative strategy, Swift’s next novel takes a much more definite stand on 
the limitations of symbolic constructs. In Waterland, violent overriding of 
reality through narration such as Prentis’s would be impossible since here 
the symbolic order is shown as repeatedly disturbed by what the narrator 
calls the “attacks of the Here and Now.”36 Tom Crick’s understanding of 
trauma is exemplified in his justification of his family’s tendency to resort 
to story-telling as a means of overcoming a sense of fear and powerlessness. 
He defines the source of the threat as “[receiving] strong doses of reality. The 
great, flat monotony of reality; the wide, empty space of reality. […] How 
do you surmount reality, children? […] How did the Cricks outwit reality? 
By telling stories.”37 Indeed, the properties and the effects of the Fenland 
landscape are markedly similar to those ascribed by Slavoj Žižek to “the 
Real in its most terrifying imaginary dimension, as the primordial abyss that 
swallows everything, dissolving all identities.”38 For the Cricks, faced with the 
32 Elizabeth Wright, Speaking Desires Can Be Dangerous (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1999), pp. 74–75.
33 Craps, Trauma and Ethics, p. 66.
34 Donald Kaczvinsky, “ ‘For One Thing, There are the Gaps’: History in Graham 
Swift’s Shuttlecock,” Critique, 40 (1998), p. 12.
35 Wright, Speaking Desires, p. 5.
36 Swift, Waterland, p. 52.
37 Swift, Waterland, p. 15.
38 Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), p. 64.
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meaninglessness of the (heavily) unmediated reality of the Fenlands, cover-
ing the traumatising emptiness is part of the effort of sustaining civilisation, 
“a struggle to preserve an artifice. It’s all a struggle to make things not seem 
meaningless. It’s all a fight against fear.”39 However, Crick’s attacks of reality 
may take more active forms, akin to the aspect of “the real [which] actively 
solicits the attention of the individual, often through an aggressive insistence 
on its materiality, making itself felt through the very impermeable border 
which prevents access to it.” Malcolm Bowie uses examples of everyday events 
that “disrupt the imaginary and symbolic constructs within which we live” 
to illustrate Lacan’s notion of irruptions of the real as a disturbance of order 
imposed on constructed reality. In his discussion of Bowie’s text, Stephen 
Ross points to two functions of this aspect of the real: “first, it demonstrates 
the persistent element of contingency and outright danger that lurks in the 
failure of these ordering practices to be exhaustive and comprehensive […] 
second, it manifests to the passer-by in a very immediate way the real of 
his own mortality – it insists on the contingency of human life, however 
well ordered it may appear.”40 For Tom Crick the traumatic experience is 
a series of tragic events from his youth and their present consequences – 
his wife’s mental illness with its background of an abortion performed in 
their adolescence, the murder of Crick’s friend by his jealous half-brother 
who is made to believe that the friend was the child’s father and finally 
the brother’s suicide provoked by the realisation that he himself is the re-
sult of an incestuous relationship. The real in Waterland may take the form 
of history sending people to wars, the scandal of Mary Crick kidnapping 
a baby, the dead body of Freddie Parr, the constant instability of the constant-
ly drained Fenlands or the young protagonists’ discovery of sexuality. Moreo-
ver, since “the sudden hallucinations of events” constitute only an exception 
to the predominant emptiness of reality, Tom Crick finds narratives, both 
personal and public, to be “the fabrication, the diversion, the reality-ob-
scuring drama” in their “longing for presence, for feature, for purpose, for 
content.”41 Crick’s need for explaining “the mess [he] was in” lies at the roots 
of his study of history and leads him to assert that even if no unambigu-
ous explanations are arrived at through narrativising human experience, the 
consolation of a substitute is a value in itself: “And can I deny that what 
I wanted all along was not some golden nugget that history would at last 
yield up, but History itself, the Grand Narrative, the filler of vacuums, the 
dispeller of fears of the dark?”42 However, unlike Prentis, Crick is painfully 
aware of the dangers of believing the illusion of completeness offered by 
39 Swift, Waterland, p. 208.
40 Ross, Introduction to Lacan.
41 Swift, Waterland, pp. 34–35.
42 Swift, Waterland, p. 53.
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human endeavours to make the contingency of reality fit the frames of nar-
ratives.
The trauma of the events from Crick’s youth destroys the idyllic sense 
of completeness for him and marks the ending of “prehistorical, pubescent 
times, when we drifted instinctively without the need for prior arrangement, 
to our meeting place.”43 In the context of this transition, George Landow 
recalls Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey” and its Romantic convention of the 
narrator’s imaginary return “to the landscape of thoughtless youth, [in which] 
he concerns himself with the losses of innocence and with the corollary fall 
into time, self-consciousness, and social existence.” Landow stresses a signifi-
cant alteration in the convention, suitable for a postmodernist text: “unlike 
‘Tintern Abbey,’ Waterland bravely refuses to find solace in some Romantic 
revision of Milton’s Fortunate Fall.” It might be noted that the distinction 
also applies to the approach taken by Prentis, who embraces the Romantic 
position without reservations. The loss of the pre-pubescent sense of wholeness 
and unity with the world also invites a parallel with the transition from the 
imaginary to the symbolic order which Prentis’s narrative refuses to make. 
While the former insists on the possibility of recovering a sense of unified, 
stable selfhood mastering its surroundings through narration, Crick stresses 
the contingency of human efforts at organising reality, presenting them as 
“fictional analogues of the land reclamation whose presence dominates the 
novel. Provisional, essential, limited as they may be, telling stories can never 
adequately control reality or nature or what’s out there or what Tom calls 
the Here and Now.”44
Awareness of this condition is precisely what does not allow Crick for 
a “cop-out from the problem of coming to terms with life in a disenchanted 
world”45 like the one performed by Prentis. The narrator of Waterland discov-
ers the limitations of symbolisation early on, when he eagerly accepts the of-
ficial cause of Freddie Parr’s death (accidental drowning) as erasing the trauma 
of knowledge that it was a murder to which he indirectly pushed his brother. 
His girlfriend’s blatant refusal to pretend ignorance leaves him disappointed, 
but aware that “he was still in the same mess, after all – just as he was think-
ing that a neat phrase had hauled him out. Just as he was succumbing to the 
illusion that everything was all right, like it was before.”46 Numerous exam-
ples which he encounters in his later work as a historian, closely entwined 
with his interpretations of his own life, consolidate his conviction: “Negating 
43 Swift, Waterland, p. 44.
44 George Landow, “History, His Story, and Stories in Graham Swift’s Waterland,” 
Studies in the Literary Imagination, vol. 23 (1990), pp. 197–211, accessed July 6, 2010, 
http://www.postcolonialweb.org/uk/gswift/wl/gplstories.html
45 Craps, Trauma and Ethics, p. 45.
46 Swift, Waterland, p. 115.
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the radically disorienting impact of trauma, typically through the pursuit of 
an illusory ideal of wholeness or completion, is shown to have catastrophic 
personal and political consequences.”47
The final scene of the novel, the suicide of Tom’s mentally handicapped 
half-brother Dick, conceived by his grandfather with his own daughter to 
become the saviour of the world, serves well to illustrate the renunciation 
of the dangerous belief in completeness of explanations effectively masking 
the traumatic nature of experience. Tamas Benyei describes the scene as an 
“eschatological event emptied of its true eschatological content and its power 
to redeem historical existence. The end provides no vantage point for Crick; 
rather, it is a moment that makes Crick’s life (and therefore history) future-
less, devoid of meaning, and thus causes a compulsion in Crick to repeat and 
re-tell the story endlessly. Instead of conferring unity and coherence on the 
story, this end makes it disjunctive.”48
Dick himself proves to be the navel of Tom’s dream, unable to process or 
become part of the events he provokes, remaining outside the narrative he set 
in motion: “He’s as fixed as that pike on the wall. He’s made things happen. 
Things have happened because of him. He can’t understand. He’s stuck in the 
past.”49 Instead of becoming a saviour of the world, providing a conclusive 
explanation of human history, a sign of complete knowledge and redemption 
from fear, Dick refuses signification altogether. He is finally linked with the 
ineffable forces of nature when he dives into the Ouse “[in] a long, reach-
ing, powerful arc … sufficiently reaching and powerful for us to observe his 
body, in its flight through the air, form a single, taut and seemingly limbless 
continuum, so that an expert on diving might have judged that here indeed 
was a natural, here indeed was a fish of a man.”50 Although the naturalising 
effect of this description might be seen as an attempt at “covering over” the 
inexpressible trauma of reality, Crick has to be credited for recognising this 
in the apology he makes to his brother for the inadequacy of the “succinct 
fabrication” of his – and indeed any – narrative.51
Graham Swift’s reworking of the theme of overcoming fear and trauma 
through narration presents a variety of approaches tending towards a quite 
consistent emphasis of both the significance and the limitations of the proc-
ess. Telling stories of their experience allows Swift’s characters to organise the 
chaos of traumatic events of their lives but never from “some privileged outside 
47 Craps, Trauma and Ethics, p. 3.
48 Tamas Benyei, “Narrative and Repetition in Waterland,” British and American Stu-
dies 1.1 (1996), p. 115. Quoted in Russell, “Embodiments of History,” http://www.questia.
com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5031566878
49 Swift, Waterland, p. 275.
50 Swift, Waterland, p. 309.
51 Swift, Waterland, p. 304.
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point”52 which would enable them to see the world as a whole. Instead of 
offering the enlightenment that Prentis claims to have achieved, story-telling 
in most of Swift’s novels performs a function analogous to that assigned by 
Tom Crick to reclamation of land (in itself an analogy of progress): “Which 
is repeatedly, never-endingly retrieving what is lost. A dogged and vigilant 
business. A dull yet valuable business. A hard, inglorious business.” Much as 
reclamation of land is not to be mistaken “for the building of empires,”53 the 
consolation of symbolic constructs, while seen by Swift as the only available 
defence against fear, by no means allows liberation from the terrifying con-
tingency of the human condition.
52 Fink, Lacan to the Letter, p. 153.
53 Swift, Waterland, p. 291.
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„Od czego w końcu jest cywilizacja?” – 
narracja jako metoda przezwyciężania lęku i traumy 
w prozie Grahama Swifta
St reszczen ie
Tom Crick, narrator najpopularniejszej powieści Grahama Swifta Kraina Wód, uważa 
opowiadanie historii za metodę łagodzenia dziecięcego lęku przed ciemnością, w potrze-
bie narracji dostrzegając wyraz typowo ludzkiego dążenia do porządkowania rzeczywisto-
ści. Fragmentaryczny i repetytywny styl narracji większości książek Swifta odzwierciedla 
charakterystyczne dla jego postaci poczucie separacji od świata i uwięzienia w momencie 
traumy, które uniemożliwia linearne rozwinięcie opowieści. Opłakując niemożliwość od-
zyskania pierwotnej pełni, powieści Swifta jednocześnie afirmują przypadkowość kondy-
cji ludzkiej, jako że wysiłki protagonistów zmierzające do przezwyciężenia strachu można 
uznać jedynie za prowizoryczne. Jednocześnie autor kwestionuje status samej narracji jako 
moralnie niejednoznacznej, potencjalnie nacechowanej przemocą i odpowiedzialnej za nie-
odwracalne zanurzenie podmiotu w czasie. Niniejszy artykuł stanowi analizę obu podejść 
do narracji jako metody racjonalnego wyjaśniania rzeczywistości w powieściach Shuttlecock 
(1982) oraz Kraina wód (1984) Grahama Swifta.
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„Wozu denn ist die Zivilisation?“ – 
Narration als die in Graham Swifts Prosawerken angewandte Methode, 
Angst und Trauma zu überwältigen
Zusammenfassung
Tom Crick, ein Erzähler in dem populärsten Roman Graham Swifts, Wasserland (engl. 
Waterland), hält die Geschichte für eine gute Methode, die kindliche Angst vor Finsternis zu 
lindern; in dem Bedarf an Erzählen sieht er ein für den Menschen typisches Streben danach, 
die Wirklichkeit in Ordnung zu bringen. Fragmentarischer und repetitiver Erzählungsstil 
von den meisten Swifts Büchern spiegelt das für alle seinen Figuren charakteristische trau-
matische Gefühl der Isolation von der Außenwelt wider, das eine lineare Entwicklung der 
Erzählung unmöglich macht. Swifts Romane beklagen die Unmöglichkeit, eine primäre Fül-
le zu erreichen und gleichzeitig heben sie die ganze Zufälligkeit der menschlichen Verfas-
sung hervor; die Bemühungen von Swifts Protagonisten, die Angst zu überwinden, müssen 
zwar lediglich als provisorisch und vorläufig betrachtet werden.
Gleichermaßen zweifelt der Verfasser an, dass die Narration selbst ethisch mehrdeu-
tig, durch Gewalt gekennzeichnet und für einen irreversiblen Tiefgang des Subjektes in der 
Welt verantwortlich ist. Der vorliegende Artikel bezweckt, die beiden Betrachtungsweisen 
von der Narration als einer Methode der rationellen Erklärung der Wirklichkeit in Graham 
Swifts Romanen Alias Federball (engl.: Shuttlecock) (1982) und Wasserland (engl.: Water-
land) (1984) zu untersuchen.
